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of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG); 
a market research company, Nielsen, who were 
contracted to conduct all research associated with 
the Games; and academic researchers who worked 
with LOCOG and Nielsen to research the Games 
volunteers.
The article first describes regulatory capitalism, 
with relation to governance and delivery of the 
2012 Games. Within this it describes LOCOG’s 
Introduction
The increasing delivery of mega-events through 
a governance structure of regulatory capitalism 
reduces public accountability and disenfranchises 
stakeholders outside the commercial sector, includ-
ing academic researchers. This article examines 
these concerns through a critique of the relation-
ship between the London Organizing Committee 
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A significant legacy of the 2012 Olympic Games was to demonstrate how such an event could be 
delivered within the governance structure of “regulatory capitalism.” The delivery of the London 
2012 Games was contracted to a private company, the London Organizing Committee of the Olym-
pic Games and Paralympic Games (LOCOG). LOCOG subcontracted packages of work, including 
Games research, which was conducted by a market research company as “sponsorship” in kind. 
Through an autoethnographic account of researching volunteers at these Games, working with the 
market research company, it is shown how: public accountability was reduced by the selective avail-
ability of research results; the access to research became a marketable resource; and research eth-
ics of the private company were inconsistent with those required within a University. Therefore, 
the delivery of the Games through regulatory capitalism reinforced the unequal power relationships 
between the different event stakeholders. This leads to a discussion of implications for researching 
mega-events and the relationship between academic research and commercial researchers. These 
include the need for researchers to pay for access and to protect their intellectual property.
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relationship with Nielsen. Using autoethnographic 
insights it then describes in detail the process of 
researching volunteers at the 2012 Games and the 
use of research results. These are used to achieve 
the aims of the article and lead to a discussion of 
the implications for researching mega-events.
Hosting a mega-event such as the Olympic Games 
is an enormous financial undertaking (Preuss, 2004). 
The 2012 London Olympic Games officially cost 
£11.3 billion (Horne & Whannell, 2012) and was 
the most expensive summer Olympic Games in 
history—surpassed only by the Sochi 2014 Winter 
Olympic Games (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier, 
2016). The International Olympic Committee and 
Olympic Games sponsors receive attention dur-
ing the Games but the vast majority of funds come 
from the tax payer (Tetlak, 2013). Of the funding 
for the 2012 Olympic Games, £9.298 billion came 
from public money through taxation (Tetlak, 2013) 
and the UK’s National Lottery. Some of this fund-
ing was expended by local government and Sport 
England, the Government’s agency for sport.
In contrast, only £0.7 billion was raised through 
direct sponsorship (the IOC’s ongoing sponsors 
provided an additional £0.35 billion) and £0.6 bil-
lion from ticket sales (“London Olympics 2012,” 
2016). Nielsen, the market research company 
discussed in this paper, provided £0.1 billion in 
sponsorship (“London Olympics 2012,” 2016). In 
order to spread the cost, minimize risk from politi-
cal intervention, and ensure timely delivery, the 
UK Government chose to deliver the 2012 Lon-
don Olympic Games through regulatory capital-
ism. While the UK public paid for the event, the 
use of contracts to private companies meant that 
the direct benefit went to the private sector. Regu-
latory capitalism serves to benefit a small group 
of stakeholders and reinforces unequal power 
relationships between the different stakeholders 
involved in a mega-event (Spracklen & Lamond, 
2016).
Regulatory Capitalism and the 2012 Games
Although the politics of mega-events have 
attracted substantial attention from researchers 
(e.g., Brix & Branagan, 2016; Cook & Ward, 2011; 
Horne, 2017), there has been limited research on 
the politics surrounding the delivery of mega-
events (Foley, McGillivray, & McPherson, 2012). 
The London 2012 Olympic Games was the first 
mega-event to be delivered through regulatory 
capitalism and this has been put forward as one of 
the event’s most significant legacies (Raco, 2012a). 
Regulatory capitalism describes a process in which 
the government no longer delivers services directly 
but facilitates the frameworks through which they 
are delivered by other agencies. The use of regula-
tory capitalism provides a key example of Grams-
cian hegemonic power in relation to mega-events 
(Gramsci, 1971). The delivery of the London 2012 
Olympic Games typifies how hegemonic power 
was taken from the public sector and the UK tax-
payer and given to commercial contractors with 
no accountability to the public.
The 2012 Olympic Games exemplified the 
process of mega-event delivery through regulatory 
capitalism (Raco, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) as LOCOG 
was a private company established to deliver the 
Games and was contracted to do so by the UK gov-
ernment. LOCOG awarded approximately 75,000 
subcontracts to private companies (Girginov, 2012), 
including one to Nielsen, a London-based informa-
tion research company, to provide research services. 
Similarly, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), 
responsible for the delivery of infrastructure, spent 
£30.7 million between 2006 and 2009 on 112 
separate consultancy contracts and “privatized the 
delivery process by appointing a consortium to act 
as delivery manager to oversee the project” (Raco, 
2014, p. 186).
Although regulatory capitalism was instigated 
within a neo-liberalist aim of reducing state activ-
ity, it has actually led to an expansion of regula-
tory agencies (Braithwaite, 2008, Levi-Faur, 2005). 
Regulation may occur through regulatory bodies, 
such as quangos; for example, those regulating the 
energy industries. More relevant to the Olympic 
Games, regulation may also be through contracts 
between the public and private sector. Writing 
these contracts requires the “costly mobilization 
and empowerment of experts, including lawyers 
and consultants” (Raco, 2014, p. 179). The detailed 
content of contracts is critical in balancing the 
interests of the contractor and the state. The con-
tractor seeks to transfer as much risk as possible 
to the state and to protect themselves against any 
change of government policy as the contract may 
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company it would not reveal details of its contracts 
with private companies because public disclosure 
of these might provide a commercial advantage 
to the company’s contractual counterparties. As 
Raco (2012a) put it, “it is (deemed to be) in the 
public interest not to know how public money is 
being spent” (p. 456); although subsequent free-
dom of information requests revealed the sums the 
ODA had paid contractors (Raco, 2014). Nichols 
and Ralston (2015) illustrated how confidential-
ity clauses governing LOCOG’s relationships and 
contracts limited the production of a knowledge 
transfer legacy from the Games, described further 
below.
Thus, criticisms of regulatory capitalism are that 
it has a “liberty cost” because the length of con-
tracts prevents further government intervention, 
and confidential details of contracts limit pub-
lic accountability. Further, as Braithwaite (2008) 
pointed out, “markets in vice are always one step 
ahead of regulatory intervention” (p. 199). By this 
he meant that the ability of contractors to protect 
their interests in contracts will normally be greater 
than the ability of the state to protect the interest 
of the public. As a consequence, regulatory capi-
talism tends to redistribute wealth to the rich and, 
as the title of Braithwaite’s book suggests, Regu-
latory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Mak-
ing it Work Better, might not produce the optimum 
outcome for society at large. However, a coun-
ter argument is that, especially in the case of the 
Games, it was a way of ensuring delivery of an 
extremely complex project was prioritized over 
political interventions once the Games were com-
mitted to. Our focus is to show how the relation-
ship between academic researchers and Nielsen, 
the London 2012 Olympic Games official market 
research company, can be understood within the 
framework of regulatory capitalism and the con-
sequences of this.
Method
This study uses an autoethnographic approach, 
as the article records the personal story of one 
of the coauthors (Cresswell, 2013). In an auto-
ethnography, the authors use their own experi-
ences to reflect on deeper issues associated with 
the research context (Dashper, 2016). In this case 
cover a period far longer than the lifetime of any 
government. At the same time, the state aims to 
deliver cost-effective public services.
Raco (2012b) illustrated the importance of con-
tract details within regulatory capitalism by recent 
examples. The 30-year-long private finance initia-
tive (PFI) contracts for hospital building and man-
agement in South London have bound local Health 
Authority Trusts into schedules of repayment over 
this period. However, when Trust income has not 
increased at the same rate as the back-loaded repay-
ments of the PFI contract it has had to cut costs 
by reducing the services offered by other hospi-
tals in the same trust. In this way, decisions over 
patient welfare over a 30-year period have been 
constrained by the terms of the original contract. In 
a second example, the Franchise Agreement under 
which a train company provides a service in South 
London included clauses protecting the company 
from as many financial risks as possible; for exam-
ple, including increases in the price of electricity 
or industrial action by its employees. Thus, all the 
risks in the contract are taken by the public sector 
(Raco, 2012b), which contradicts the aim of gov-
ernment to actually reduce their risk.
A further feature of regulatory capitalism is that 
the state itself has to contract experts to write the 
contracts, and these experts may have interests 
overlapping with potential contractors. Nichols and 
Ralston (2015) illustrated the potential overlap of 
interests in the awarding of contracts to deliver 
Olympic Games services by showing how Deloitte 
seconded over 130 staff to LOCOG and could thus 
influence the writing of contracts. At the same time 
Deloitte published a strategy for Olympic procure-
ment (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2011), 
advising companies interested in tendering for 
Olympic contracts. This may have been a happy 
coincidence for Deloitte, but clearly Deloitte would 
benefit from being able to advise both those writing 
contracts and those bidding for them. The case of 
Deloitte illustrated further the unequal power rela-
tions inherent in the use of regulatory capitalism 
as a mega-event delivery framework.
Within regulatory capitalism, confidentiality 
clauses covering the details of contracts—which 
would be normal in the private sector—may con-
strain public accountability. For example, although 
the Olympic Delivery Authority was a public 
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Researching the 2012 London 
Olympic and Paralympic Games
London was the first host city of the Olympic 
and Paralympic Games to have an official market 
research provider. In June 2009, LOCOG appointed 
Nielsen, a major market research organization, as 
a “value in kind” sponsor; as such, Nielsen was 
expected to contribute between £10–£20 million 
worth of services. For example, the chief execu-
tive of LOCOG was reported as saying that Nielsen 
researched the price elasticity of demand for tickets 
to determine ticket pricing acceptable to the pub-
lic. Nielsen also researched the propensity of the 
UK public to volunteer, to help define the required 
number of volunteers and how to market this oppor-
tunity to prospective volunteers (Fernandez, 2012). 
Up to July 2012, Nielsen conducted over 80 such 
research projects for LOCOG.
Whether intended or not, the effect of contracting 
research to Nielsen was that the ability of academ-
ics to research the London 2012 Games was limited. 
The use of “nondisclosure” agreements, common 
within commercial contracting, had already pre-
vented a publicly-funded Knowledge Transfer proj-
ect into the Games achieving its potential. This 
project paired 10 academics with managers of func-
tional areas of LOCOG to conduct research from 
autumn 2011, with the aim of producing a report 
(Girginov & Gold, 2013). However, only three of 
the researchers associated with the project were 
able to contribute to the report due to difficulties 
they encountered with gaining access to official 
information. These included the requirement for 
researchers to sign a “nondisclosure agreement,” 
which implied that they could not publish material 
regarding the London 2102 Games, using infor-
mation gained from LOCOG, without LOCOG’s 
permission (Nichols & Ralston, 2015). The use of 
nondisclosure agreements in this context casts a 
veil over attempted analyses of the event and its 
delivery as well as evaluating its outcomes.
We presume that this nondisclosure agreement 
was a blanket “agreement” signed by all LOCOG’s 
contractors and official sponsors. This ensured com-
mercial confidentiality, but it also gave LOCOG 
complete control over information about the Lon-
don 2012 Games, which was important from their 
perspective in terms of promoting positive public 
the article is concerned with the power relations 
between the private companies who were awarded 
the contracts for the London Olympic Games and 
academic researchers studying the event as well as 
ethical behavior more generally. The personal nar-
rative of the researchers’ experiences from working 
with Nielsen raises issues with broader application 
to how academics can conduct research at mega-
events. The personal narrative—or “headnotes” 
(Wall, 2008)—is expanded to include e-mail and 
telephone correspondence with the different par-
ties involved in this story as well as supporting 
documentary evidence from published articles.
This narrative involves three key parties:
Angela Benson and her research team Tra-1. 
cey Dickson, Deborah Blackman, and Anne 
Terwiel;
Nielsen, market research company, represented 2. 
by David Lucas, Head of Research;
Amanda Alexander, a Ph.D. student at the Uni-3. 
versity of Missouri and her supervisors Dae-
Young Kim and Ingolf Gruen.
In addition to these three actors, other event 
stakeholders include the UK taxpayers who pre-
dominantly funded the Games and LOCOG, who 
were appointed by the UK Government to deliver 
the Games on their behalf.
Autoethnography is a narrative approach to 
research and draws on storytelling as a technique. 
Dashper (2016) argued that autoethnography is a 
relatively new method for critical event studies 
although this is growing (e.g., Kodama, Doherty, 
& Popovic, 2013; Lamond, 2018) and has much 
potential to provide insights into the experiences 
of the different stakeholders in the events sphere. 
This article presents an analytic autoethnogra-
phy (Coghlan, 2012), whereby the researcher 
is a member of the research team and their per-
sonal account is set within the wider context of 
the research topic. These narratives document 
the experiences of Benson’s team as they sought 
to conduct research at the London 2012 Olympic 
Games. However, as noted above, this narrative 
involves two other parties who are inextricably 
linked with the story. Both parties were contacted 
as part of this study but did not respond to our 
requests for clarification.
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A meeting took place in March 2012 between 
Benson, the Head of Volunteer Program, the Head 
of Research & Insight (LOCOG—Nielson), a mem-
ber of the Meta Evaluation team, a representative 
from the National Council for Voluntary Orga-
nizations (NCVO), a government representative 
from the Department for Culture, Media & Sport 
(DCMS), and the original contact from LOCOG. 
Further e-mail exchanges led to a meeting in May 
2012. These e-mails from Benson to the members 
at the March meeting included a pdf document of 
the proposed questionnaire, which was based on the 
Vancouver 2010 survey. This meeting established 
the basis for an agreement that LOCOG/Nielson 
would send out the questionnaire, subject to a num-
ber of changes in question wording to the original 
survey, which is common with studies across mul-
tiple events (Lockstone-Binney, Holmes, Baum, & 
Smith, 2014). Further e-mails were then exchanged 
between those involved in previous meetings and 
the research team to finalize the questionnaire to 
meet everyone’s approval. It took 5 months for 
the final questionnaire to be agreed, which was an 
adaption of the questionnaire used in Vancouver 
2010.
On September 11, 2012, following the comple-
tion of both the Olympic and Paralympic events, 
Nielsen distributed the questionnaire by e-mail to 
all those who had volunteered at the London Games 
(“Games Makers”). The UK Government consis-
tently claimed that “the London 2012 volunteer 
programme . . . recruited and trained 70,000 peo-
ple to support the staging of the Games” (DCMS, 
2013, p. 3). The Head of Research & Insight con-
firmed that “Yes, the questionnaire will be going 
out to the full Games Maker database” (September 
11, 2012) so the research team assumed the sample 
was 70,000 volunteers.
For Benson and Dickson, distribution would 
ideally have been 1 month prior to the start of the 
Games to make timing comparable with the Van-
couver study. However, “a requirement of LOCOG 
was that the survey was to be sent out two days 
after the completion of the Paralympics [and] the 
survey was closed 5 days later” (Dickson et al., 
2014, p. 167).
We acknowledge that academia is a competi-
tive field and the research team was keen to ensure 
exclusive use of this data set, and requests for a 
perceptions. In relation to this article, this prevented 
at least one academic researcher working with the 
volunteer manager at LOCOG because the use of 
information from the collaboration was potentially 
restricted, which limited the value of an academic 
analysis. As described below, official access to 
researching volunteers at 2012 was restricted to 
academics working with Nielsen. Other academ-
ics have researched volunteering at the Games, 
but have been restricted to using small, indepen-
dently recruited samples (e.g., Holmes, Nichols, & 
Ralston, 2017).
Surveying the London 2012 Olympic 
and Paralympic Games: Gaining 
Access and Planning Research
Gaining access to research at mega-events is 
often complex due to the many layers of approval 
that are needed and often competing groups of 
researchers who are seeking access to different ele-
ments of the event. Although research access for 
academics at the London 2012 Games was difficult, 
an independent research team (Tracey Dickson, 
Angela Benson, Deborah Blackman, and Anne Ter-
wiel) submitted an application to the International 
Paralympic Committee (IPC) to request approval 
to replicate at the London 2012 Games a survey 
of volunteers that they had used previously at the 
Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics. This had exam-
ined the profile, motivation, and satisfaction of 
volunteers and the legacy of volunteering after the 
2010 Games. The 2010 Vancouver Games research 
study was supported by the IPC and the Vancouver 
Winter Olympics Committee (VANOC), and results 
(including details of the survey instrument) were 
published in a number of papers (Benson, Dick-
son, Terwiel, & Blackman, 2014; Dickson, Benson, 
Blackman, & Terweil; 2013; Dickson, Benson, & 
Terwiel, 2014).
Permission to undertake the London 2012 Games 
research was granted in August 2011 by the IPC, 
who agreed to speak to LOCOG in order for the 
research team to negotiate access to undertake 
the research. The research team met in London in 
October 2011. Dickson and Benson were able to 
secure a meeting with a member of the LOCOG 
staff, which opened up a dialogue with LOCOG 
regarding the potential to undertake the research.
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Dickson and Benson were sent results by Nielsen 
on September 18, 2012. The 11,451 respondents 
provided the largest data set yet produced of 
Olympic and Paralympic volunteers. An article 
reporting analysis of motivations, compared with 
the motivations of volunteers at Vancouver, 2010, 
was submitted in July 2013 and published in 2014 
(Dickson et al., 2014). This article reported that:
The instrument used for both Vancouver 2010 
(see Dickson et al., 2013) and London 2012 was 
developed from previous uses of the SEVMS 
[Special Events Volunteer Motivation Scale]. . . . 
The final instrument design for London 2012 
was developed in conjunction with LOCOG’s 
Research Department to support their evaluation 
strategies and to build upon previous research  
on large and mega sport volunteers.
However, the same survey results were used in 
Alexander’s Ph.D. thesis, “A model of volunteer 
intention at a mega-event, the London 2012 Olym-
pics,” submitted in May 2013, at the University of 
Missouri (Alexander, 2013). This used a sampling 
frame of 44,700 Olympic volunteers. Of these, 11,521 
responded, a response rate of 25.5% (Alexander, 
2013, p. 65). A subsequent paper based on this the-
sis, of which one of the supervisors was a co-author 
(Alexander et al., 2015), used a sample of 11,451; 
having removed outliers and incomplete responses. 
This (11,451) was identical to the size of the sample 
sent to Dickson and Benson.
Alexander’s thesis stated that she obtained the 
survey data though direct contact with David Lucas, 
Head of Research & Insight at Nielsen: “Data 
was directly obtained from Nielson (London 2012 
Volunteer Evaluation, 2012; https://sdel.acnielsen.
co.uk)” (Alexander, 2013, p. 68). The internet link 
in this section is no longer valid, but earlier in the 
thesis Alexander quotes a personal communica-
tion with the manager of Nielsen: “without these 
individuals we wouldn’t know the Olympics as we 
know it today” (Alexander, 2013, p. 55), thus con-
firming her direct contact with David Lucas.
Thus, Dickson and Benson thought they had 
been assured by David Lucas that they would have 
unique access to the volunteer survey results, but 
these were also passed to Alexander. This raises 
ethical questions over the behavior of Nielsen.
To further unpick how two independent groups 
of researchers reported very similar datasets, 
formal document stating this were expressed during 
the discussions. Indeed, the questionnaire instrument 
represented their intellectual property. The team was 
verbally assured that their questionnaire was being 
used and the data would be forwarded to them once 
it was collected. This promise was later confirmed by 
the Head of Research & Insight in e-mail exchanges 
with DCMS staff and again by David Lucas, the 
Head of Research at Nielsen, stating that the raw 
data would only go to two researchers (Dickson and 
Benson) and not be shared with any other party.
In response to the DCMS asking the research 
team for use of some of the data, Dickson replied:
As David (Lucas) has said, in general this was 
being run for us as part of an IPC approved 
research project, but we agreed with LOCOG 
that they would do a “top line” analysis of the 
data, which I believe Anita [member of the Meta 
Evaluation team commissioned by the DCMS] is 
working on, as part of the post Games reporting. 
(E-mail extract September 28, 2012)
As a result of further discussions between 
DCMS and the research team, it was agreed that 
Dickson and Benson would write an annex docu-
ment for the DCMS Meta Evaluation Report, which 
was the Government’s official review of a Games 
legacy (Dickson & Benson, 2013). It was on this 
basis that Benson’s team believed that they would 
have unique access to the data.
Surveying the London 2012 Olympic  
and Paralympic Volunteers:  
Access to the Survey Results
In spite of Nielsen’s assurances that Benson’s 
team would receive exclusive access to the survey 
results, there appear to be conflicting understandings 
of who would be given access to these data. This, 
and conflicting claims for design of the survey, also 
illustrate ethical questions, which appear to originate 
from the involvement of a commercial research part-
ner, which has signed a nondisclosure agreement.
Although Dickson and Benson believed they 
would be given exclusive access to the survey results 
these were also passed to Alexander and used as the 
basis of a Ph.D. submitted at the University of Mis-
souri (Alexander, 2013), and subsequently in an aca-
demic article (Alexander, Kim, & Kim, 2015).
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Nielson, with LOCOG and DCMS staff, during that 
time. As noted above, the design was developed 
from the version used by the Dickson and Benson’s 
research team in Vancouver 2010.
The authors contacted Lucas, Alexander, and 
Dae-Young Kim (Kim was Alexander’s supervisor, 
coauthor of her article, and a member of the ethics 
team approving her research) to clarify the relation-
ship between Alexander and Nielsen. In response to 
an inquiry from Dickson and Benson, David Lucas 
said that the Nielsen team would only ever have 
supplied her [Alexander] with the data relating to 
the questions that were run for her, though could 
not vouch for whether or not the Volunteering team 
shared other information with her. By “the Volun-
teering team” David Lucas must mean LOCOG’s 
volunteer management staff.
An e-mail from one of the authors of this article 
to Dae-Young Kim asked for clarification on his 
role in the design of the volunteer survey. Dae-
Young Kim responded that he had codeveloped the 
questionnaire with Nielsen and that Alexander’s 
survey was designed by her with the supervisory 
team and then modified by Nielsen. Clarifica-
tion was also sought from Alexander, but with no 
response. In contrast, Dickson and Benson have 
provided a detailed account of their survey design 
and administration through the autoethnographic 
account presented in this article and in other pub-
lished articles (Benson et al., 2015; Dickson et al., 
2013).
Dae-Young Kim was also asked if he had paid 
Nielson for any data. This was queried because 
when Dickson and Benson asked Nielsen if they 
could repeat their survey again at the 2016 Rio de 
Janeiro Olympic Games, where Nielsen had also 
been appointed the official researchers, Nielsen 
indicated that this would probably not be possible 
without a fee (suggested to be in the region of 
£10,000). Dae-Young Kim said he had not paid for 
any results.
The lack of information and conflicting views 
raises the possibility that Nielsen worked with two 
sets of academics. Possibly Dickson and Benson’s 
group provided the initial questionnaire, which was 
then modified through consultations with Alexander 
and Kim, before the final version was sent to 
Dickson and Benson by LOCOG on September 
17, 2012. However, this does not alter the fact 
we examine the methods from Alexander’s thesis. 
In the thesis the methods are described:
An online questionnaire was used to collect data 
for this study. The sample frame consisted of indi-
viduals that were volunteers of the London 2012 
Olympics. In an attempt to reach all volunteers 
to adequately provide a profile of Olympic vol-
unteers, all individuals that provided an e-mail 
address along with consent to receive communica-
tion from the London Organising Committee of the 
Olympic Games and Paralympic Games received 
an e-mail invitation to become a participant of the 
research study. (Alexander, 2013, p. 56)
On sampling, the thesis reports that:
The sample was obtained through collaborative 
efforts with the London Organising Committee of 
the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, direct 
contact with the sample was not possible due to 
regulations and policies set forth by the United 
Kingdom that prohibited the direct release of vol-
unteers’ contact information. (Alexander, 2013, 
p. 57)
And on questionnaire development, Alexander’s 
(2013) thesis reports that:
A self-administered online questionnaire was 
developed through the collaborative efforts of the 
researcher and the London Organising Committee 
of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games. . . . 
The purpose of research overlapped for both the 
researcher and Head of Research and Insight for 
the London Organising Committee of the Olympic 
Games and Paralympic Games. (p. 59)
In her 2015 article, Alexander reports that, “The 
questionnaire survey items for the present research 
were developed through collaborative efforts 
between the researchers and a contact within the 
Head of Research and Insight for . . . LOCOG” 
(p. 3).
The questionnaire reproduced in Alexander’s 
(2013) Ph.D. (pp. 141–154) is identical to that sent 
by a member of the LOCOG staff working with 
Nielson on the London 2012 Meta Evaluation to 
Dickson, Benson, and David Lucas, on Septem-
ber 17, 2012. The research team recorded the trail 
of e-mails from May 11, 2012 to September 17, 
2012, tracking the changes to the questionnaire that 
were negotiated between Dickson and Benson and 
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as a political aspect of a “legacy” was important 
(Nichols, 2017).
An aspect of the sample that was sensitive to 
the UK government, and available to both research 
teams, was the demographics of the sample. Alexan-
der reported the break-down of her sample of 11,451 
by ethnicity, area of the UK, and by three income 
brackets. For example, she reports that over 35.5% 
of those who indicated their household income 
earned over £50,000 and 80% over £22,000. The 
UK median household income was £14,000 at this 
time, so Games Makers were clearly unrepresen-
tative in this respect. This is information LOCOG 
have not elsewhere made public, possibly because 
it contradicts LOCOG’s claims that their volunteer-
ing was socially inclusive (DCMS, 2013).
Alexander also reports that 70.6% of her sam-
ple came from London and the South East, while 
the DCMS reported 55% came from these areas 
(DCMS, 2013). If Alexander’s reporting was cor-
rect then either the survey sample significantly 
overrepresented volunteers from these areas, or 
Games Makers were less representative of the UK 
population than the DCMS claimed. In consider-
ing the number of volunteers at the Games it is 
possible that the same people volunteering at both 
the Olympic and Paralympic Games were double 
counted, as has happened at previous Olympic 
Games (Lockstone-Binney, Holmes, Shipway, & 
Smith, 2016). In considering the demographics of 
volunteers, Dickson and Benson had access to this 
data set, although they choose not to report on it in 
the DCMS annex (DCMS, 2013).
Thus, it is only via the results reported by Alexan-
der that we have become aware that the total number 
of volunteers may have been closer to 44,770 than 
the 70,000 officially claimed at the London Games.
Discussion and Conclusions: Regulatory 
Capitalism and Researching the Olympic Games
This article has examined regulatory capitalism, in 
which work formerly done by the public sector is con-
tracted to the private sector, and the outcome is con-
tingent on details of the contract (Braithwaite, 2008) 
and how it has affected public accountability and the 
relationship between academics and mega-events.
As with other mega-events, the primary spon-
sor of the London 2012 Olympic Games was the 
that Dickson and Benson were assured by Nielsen 
they would have exclusive use of the results; and 
the questionnaire Alexander claims to have had a 
major role in designing was originally designed by 
the Dickson and Benson group.
Surveying the London 2012 Olympic  
and Paralympic Volunteers:  
Selective use of the Survey Results
The ethical issues raised in the account presented 
in this article stem from the use of regulatory capi-
talism to deliver the London 2012 Olympic Games. 
This created different power dynamics between a 
nonaccountable private market research company 
and academic researchers who are accountable 
to their university ethics committees and aca-
demic peers when seeking to publish their work. 
The data provided to the two research groups 
suggests that Nielsen (and possibly LOCOG) 
sought to release selective data about the volun-
teer program to ensure a positive image was pub-
licly presented. The selective release of survey 
results by the commercial researcher illustrates 
a possible conflict with public accountability.
Both groups of researchers were provided with 
different information about the sample. Alexan-
der reports that 44,700 questionnaires were sent 
out “through collaboration with the London 2012 
Olympic volunteer teams” (Alexander et al., 2015, 
p. 3). Dickson and Benson were not made spe-
cifically aware of the sampling frame and had to 
assume it was “the estimated 70,000 volunteers”—
the total number of volunteers consistently cited 
by LOCOG. As all Games Maker communication 
was conducted via e-mail, Alexander’s reported 
sampling frame of 44,700 may be an accurate rep-
resentation of the total number of volunteers, and 
suggests that 70,000 was an exaggeration on the 
part of LOCOG.
Alexander’s account in her thesis, cited above, 
that “one questionnaire was developed as a means 
to ensure that potential participants of the study 
would not opt to participate in both questionnaires 
and as a result lower the response rate of either 
research entity” (p. 59), supports evidence that the 
figure of 70,000 double counted those volunteering 
in the Games and Paralympic Games. However, for 
the UK Government maintaining the higher figure 
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the potential benefits of the event to the public 
(Gramsci, 1971).
The research ethics of Nielsen, in promising 
access to results to one set of researchers and then 
passing the results to another set, are questionable. 
Nielsen could have been held accountable for this 
if their relationship with the research team had 
been enshrined in a formal contract. In terms of 
the relationship between Nielsen and both teams 
of academic researchers, there was clearly a lack 
of transparency and an apparent lack of concern 
for either team’s intellectual property. The con-
flict of commercial and research interests means it 
is important for Dickson and Benson to copyright 
their questionnaire to prevent Nielsen using it again 
without their permission and it is not clear whether 
this is still possible. In contrast legal protections 
were enshrined in contracts awarded to official 
sponsors of the Games (James & Osborn, 2012) 
and enforced vigorously.
We do not know what the volunteer Games 
 Makers who responded to the questionnaire were 
told was the purpose of the research and how results 
would be used or who would have access to the 
raw data. Any university ethics committee would 
have required the purpose of the research to have 
been clearly stated; whether it was for LOCOG, 
Dickson and Benson’s research, or Alexander’s 
Ph.D. Alexander’s position is problematic as she 
states that she designed the survey Dickson and 
Benson were mainly responsible for. This extends 
to the statements in the article by Alexander et al. 
(2015), and the role of D-Y Kim in giving ethical 
approval of Alexander’s thesis. However, without 
responses from these actors in this story—although 
requested—it is not possible to unpack exactly 
what happened.
An implication of the delivery of mega-events 
through the structures of regulatory capitalism is 
that academic researchers are advised to copyright 
their research tools and obtain formal contracts 
with the event managers; specifying access to, 
and use of, research results. Contracts will need to 
be negotiated by their university research office. 
Reliance on trust, verbal, or written agreements 
is unlikely to be sufficient to protect intellectual 
property as there is a potential conflict between 
interests of commercial companies and academ-
ics (Nichols & Ralston, 2015), with commercial 
UK taxpayer (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016; Tetlak, 2013). 
However, public accountability for the consider-
able sums spent on the Games was reduced because 
research by Nielsen was mainly used just for 
LOCOG, and results of the volunteer survey were 
released selectively. Specifically, if our proposition 
that the Games involved substantially fewer than 
70,000 volunteers is correct, this information would 
have undermined official claims. Confidentially 
clauses, common in commercial contracts, limited 
critical analysis of the Games as researchers were 
both unable to gain access and publish their findings 
without possible censure (Girginov & Gold, 2013). 
This also brings into question the extent to which 
other research conducted by Nielsen for LOCOG 
may have been withheld because its results did not 
support the public impression LOCOG wished to 
give. Given that the London 2012 Olympic Games 
were primarily publicly funded (Tetlak, 2013), the 
public might want to see the results of Nielsen’s 80 
projects that informed this event.
Under the framework of regulatory capitalism, 
research findings, and the access to research, be-
come a marketable resource. Nielsen’s relationship 
with LOCOG enabled them to also be appoin ted 
the official researchers of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro 
Olympic Games. As a key broker they attempted 
to use this position to sell access to volunteers at 
Rio 2016.
Although not a main concern of this article, 
LOCOG’s commercial priorities also meant that 
the database of 5.3m individuals, including both 
volunteers and people who bought a ticket for the 
Olympics, was sold in February 2013, through a 
competitive tendering process, to a partnership of 
Sport England, UK Sport, and London & Partners. 
London & Partners are a public–private partnership 
that aims to increase leisure and business visitors 
and bids to secure major events in London. This 
prevented use of the database earlier by Sport Eng-
land to try and recruit sports volunteers from those 
at the Games (Nichols & Ralston, 2015). The fail-
ure of OCOGs including LOCOG to manage access 
to the volunteer database after the Games has been 
noted as a significant limitation in creating a volun-
teer legacy (Lockstone-Binney et al., 2016). This 
is yet another example of how regulatory capital-
ism in the delivery of the London 2012 Olympic 
Games reinforced hegemonic power and reduced 
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has been shown to be an effective way to ensure an 
extremely complex mega-event, with considerable 
political capital invested in it, is delivered on time 
(Raco, 2014). So, we are likely to see this gover-
nance structure repeated with future events hosted 
by neoliberal democracies. Thus, the implications 
for conducting academic research as discussed 
above will be significant.
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